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LIENS AND LEECHES: THE UNFAIR APPLICATION
OF THE ILLINOIS HEALTH CARE SERVICES LIEN
ACT AND THE NEED FOR REFORM
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a typical morning.  You are driving with your spouse, talk-
ing casually and planning the day ahead.  Suddenly, a vehicle crashes
into you.  The collision causes extensive injury to you and your
spouse.  On your way to the hospital you are not worrying about the
price of your medical treatment; after all, you are paying significant
premiums for your health insurance.1  You affirmatively tell yourself
that  situations like this are exactly the reason you are mandated to
have health insurance.2  You also figure that your medical bills will be
significantly reduced due to your coverage.3  With all this in mind, you
assume you will be adequately compensated after suing the driver at
fault.  Two Illinois residents found themselves in this exact situation in
August 2010.4
Blagota and Tomica Premovic assumed the foregoing.5  Unfortu-
nately, their assumptions, no matter how logical and grounded in no-
1. Health insurance premiums for insureds have steadily risen in the past years. See Ameet
Sachdev, Blue Cross Premiums Jump More than 17 Percent in Illinois, CHI. TRIBUNE (Nov. 16,
2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-blue-cross-aca-premiums-1116-biz-20151113-
story.html; See also Lisa Schencker, Illinois’ Obamacare Plans Seek Big 2017 Premium Hikes,
CHI. TRIBUNE (Aug. 2, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-illinois-obamacare-
rates-0802-biz-20160801-story.html.
2. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
3. There are several varieties of plans offered to consumers, the most common are Exclusive
Provider Organizations (EPO), Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO), Point of Service
(POS), Preferred Provider Organizations (PPO), Medicare and Medicaid.  Ashlee Kieler, Insur-
ance Loopholes & Master Pricing: How Surprise Medical Bills Knock Consumers Down, CON-
SUMERIST (Sept. 24, 2015), https://consumerist.com/2015/09/24/a-loopholes-and-master-pricing-
how-surprise-medical-bills-knock-consumers-down/.
4. There were 296,049 crashes involving motor vehicles in 2014 in Illinois. ILL. DEP’T OF
TRANSP., 2014 ILLINOIS CRASH FACTS & STATISTICS 8 (2014), http://www.idot.illinois.gov/Assets/
uploads/files/Transportation-System/Resources/Safety/Crash-Reports/crash-facts/2014%20
CF.pdf.  Illinois defines crash as “an occurrence that takes place on public roadways, involving a
moving motor vehicle and produces death, injury, or damage in excess of $1,500 to any one
person’s property when all drivers in the crash are insured.  If the driver does not have insur-
ance, the threshold is $500.” Id. at 49.
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tions of fairness, were wrong.6  The hospital where they received
treatment did not bill their insurance.  Instead, the hospital filed a lien
under the Illinois Health Care Services Lien Act (the “Act”) for the
full amount of the medical services rendered.7  By filing this lien the
hospital avoided the substantial discounts that the Premovic’s insur-
ance policy provided.8  Ultimately, the Premovics received a settle-
ment of $27,000, while the hospital liens totaled approximately
$8,500.9  The Act expressly provides that hospitals facing situations
like this can assert liens equal to the costs of the medical services ren-
dered.10  The Act does not explicitly require hospitals to bill their pa-
tient’s health insurance to reflect the discounted rate, which allows
hospitals to recover more money to the detriment of the injured indi-
vidual.11  If the tort system is founded upon notions of “making
whole” those persons who have been injured, how and why is this
justified?12
The Premovics’ situation is an unfortunate yet common issue for
Illinois tort plaintiffs because the Act gives health care providers and
professionals a mechanism that allows them to unjustly receive dam-
age awards that rightly belong to the injured plaintiff.  The Act incen-
tivizes health care providers and professionals to assert medical liens,
rather than submitting medical bills to insurance companies.13  Under
this scheme, injured parties are not given the substantial discounts
their insurance policy mandates, and health care providers are able to
recover the inflated rates via the judicial liens.14
This Comment argues that the Illinois legislature’s and judiciary’s
failure to address this problem is unacceptable for it acts as a barrier
to substantial recovery and, in some instances, creates a reluctance to
file suit.  This Comment further argues that Illinois should adopt a
reading of the current Health Maintenance Organization Act (HMO
Act) that requires health care providers and professionals to accept




10. 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 23/10 (West 2003).
11. 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 23 (West 2003).
12. Jonathan T. Molot, How U.S. Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives, 73 IND. L.J. 60, 63
(1997).
13. There is no requirement that health care providers and professionals bill their patient’s
medical insurance.  770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 23 (2016).
14. 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 23/10 (2016).  This guaranteed recovery does not occur when the
total amount of all liens under the Act meets or exceeds 40% of the plaintiff’s verdict.  770 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 23/10(c) (2016).
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the contractual amounts negotiated by plaintiffs’ health insurance
provider.15
Part II provides a general background of different types of liens and
how they attach to damages awards.16  Next, it explores the relevant
history of health care liens in Illinois laws prior to 2003.17  It then pro-
vides rationales behind the enactment of health care lien laws and the
difficulties plaintiffs encounter when trying to challenge the “reasona-
ble charges” of the health care providers and professionals.  Lastly,
Part II describes the interplay between the Act and the Attorney’s
Lien Act.18
Part III argues that the Act incentivizes medical providers and pro-
fessionals to assert liens to maximize their financial recovery, leaving
personal injury plaintiffs with a decreased damages amount.19  This
incentive can largely be attributed to Illinois judicial decisions that
have not required medical providers to comply with insurance con-
tracts that suggest lower rates of service.
Part IV argues that personal injury plaintiffs are disincentivized
from bringing suit because of (1) judicial interpretations of the Act,
(2) the high cost of litigation, and (3) the Act’s favorable treatment of
medical providers.  Part IV concludes with an analysis of the HMO
Act prior to and subsequent from the enactment of the Health Care
Services Lien Act, which reveals numerous inconsistencies in Illinois
courts.
Part V concludes that applying the existing HMO Act would pro-
vide compensatory balance between plaintiffs and medical providers,
and it would also accomplish one of the purposes of the Health Care
Services Lien Act—to incentivize plaintiffs to bring lawsuits when in-
jured by a tortfeasor.
II. BACKGROUND
Section A begins by defining and identifying different types of liens,
including the way Illinois courts have defined “liens” within the Act.
Section B describes the state of the “reasonable value of medical ser-
vices,” a term often used in medical lien statutes.  Section C then de-
15. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 125/2-8(a) (2016).
16. See infra notes 20–28 and accompanying text.
17. What follows is an analysis of the Illinois Health Care Services Lien Act, 770 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 23 (2016), from its enactment in 2003 to the present, including the legislative history pre-
ceding its enactment and the role the Illinois Supreme Court played in the motive behind the
enactment in 2003.
18. 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1 (2016).
19. See infra notes 122–280 and accompanying text.
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scribes medical liens prior to 2003.  Section D then details the
legislative history of the 2003 Act and its purported purpose, before
turning to its operative provisions and effects.  Section E explores the
2012 Amendment to the Act.  Section F provides the rationales for
health care lien acts and how to contest the reasonableness of hospital
charges.  Section G provides background of the common fund doc-
trine and attorney’s fees, both of which are components to a major
battleground in fee-shifting and, in turn, a plaintiff’s recovery.  Finally,
Section H addresses Medicare and Medicaid purpose and coverage.
A. Liens
To fully grasp how the Act works for health care providers and pro-
fessionals the concept of the lien must be analyzed.  In general there
are three types of liens: common law liens, equitable liens, and statu-
tory liens.20  Common law liens are the result of services performed by
the lienholder in relation to the property to which the lien attaches.21
Common law liens establish the lienholder’s right to retain possession
of the debtor’s property until that debt is satisfied.22  Equitable liens
are created by courts as a remedy for a debt owed, which can arise
from an express or implied agreement, or can be granted by the court
to prevent unjust enrichment.23  Statutory liens are created by the leg-
islature and generally provide liens to persons who did not otherwise
have one at common law.24  The Act is an example of the creation of a
statutory lien.
B. How Medical Providers Determine Rates for Services Rendered
Health care liens have changed how health care providers charge
and ultimately collect for services rendered.25  Historically, health care
providers were free to set and collect the amount they billed pa-
20. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Liens § 7 (2016).
21. R.J. Robertson, Attorney’s Liens in Illinois: An Analysis and Critique, 30 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1,
3 (2005).  An example of a common law lien is where a bailee increases the value of the bailor’s
property for the value of the bailee’s services. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 5.  An example of an equitable lien is where one makes valuable improvements on
another’s property with that person’s knowledge and consent; a lien is recognized in order to
prevent unjust enrichment.  Id.
24. Id.  In Illinois, the Attorney’s Lien Act and the Health Care Services Lien act are two
examples of statutory liens enacted to provide liens to persons who did not have them at com-
mon law. Id. at 4 & n.20.
25. These changes have resulted in numerous lawsuits filed challenging the validity of the
laws. See infra note 239.
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tients.26  Hospitals set these rates using a system commonly referred
to as a “chargemaster.”27  A chargemaster is a list of the rates for each
procedure a hospital performs, as well as the price of every item used
during the procedure.28  With the exception of one state, hospitals are
not required to post their chargemaster lists for the public to view.29
Keeping the list private provides a safeguard that shields hospitals
from pressure to lower their rates.30  Recent studies have been re-
leased to bring transparency to chargemaster rates.31  Additionally,
hospital officials have even admitted the rates they initially charge
serve no purpose other than establishing the starting point for
negotiations.32
Understanding the history and purpose of health care lien acts is
necessary to fully comprehend why hospitals and health care provid-
ers assert liens.  These acts were first introduced in the 1930s with two
main purposes: (1) to protect hospitals from the heavy burden of
treating insolvent or uninsured patients, and (2) to incentivize hospi-
tals to treat a patient before checking whether the patient could actu-
ally pay for the services rendered.33  However, these initial policy
rationales have slowly eroded as the percentage of those with health
insurance in 1940 (9.3%) pales in comparison to those with health in-
surance today.34
To combat the burden of treating insolvent and uninsured patients,
the Act addresses this issue by providing automatic recovery for hos-
pitals regardless of the insurance or income status of the patient.35
The Act goes further in its defense of hospitals by affording them the
right to pursue patients for any leftover charges after the lien is satis-
26. Michael K. Beard & Dylan H. Marsh, Arbitrary Healthcare Pricing and the Misuse of
Hospital Lien Statutes by Healthcare Providers, 38 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 255 (2014).
27. Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind a Veil of Secrecy,
25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 57, 58 (2006).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 59.  California is the only state that requires their chargemaster rates be available to
the public.
30. Beard & Marsh, supra note 30, at 270.
31. Id. at 256–257.
32. Id. at 256.
33. Id. at 257.
34. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VITAL STATISTICS AND HEALTH AND MEDICAL CARE, at 82,
available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/CT1970p1-03.pdf.
35. 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 23/10 (2016); Lisa Schencker, Uninsured rate drops again in Illinois
after Obamacare takes effect, CHI. TRIBUNE (Sept. 13, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/busi
ness/ct-census-uninsured-obamacare-0914-biz-20160913-story.html (explaining, as of the begin-
ning of 2016, the uninsured rate in the United States was 9.4%).
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fied.36  These two mechanisms are especially important because the
Act provides that charges that can be claimed are “reasonable
charges” for the services rendered.37  Crucially, the Act does not in-
clude a definition of “reasonable charges.”38  Thus, the private nature
of the chargemaster system, the automatic recovery of payment via
the liens, along with the ability to seek additional compensation after
the lien has been satisfied, has provided hospitals with complete con-
trol over how much they can charge and collect from patients.
C. Illinois Medical Liens Prior to 2003
The state of health care liens prior to the Act was convoluted.39
There were eight different medical lien acts that, depending on the
profession, entitled individuals to assert liens against personal injury
plaintiffs.40  Case law interpreting these acts was particularly unfavor-
able to personal injury plaintiffs.41  In 1997 the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois in Burrell v. Southern Truss held that when liens were asserted
under two different medical lien acts, the total value of liens could
exceed one-third of the plaintiff’s settlement.42  While in Burrell, the
amount exceeding one-third of the plaintiff’s recovery was a mere
$82.53, the dissenting opinion written by Justice Harrison noted there
may be cases where the plaintiff receives nothing after the various
liens are asserted.43  The majority in Burrell found support for its con-
clusion in the House Proceedings, which revealed that all such liens
were to be treated “on the same footing.”44  Thus, prior to 2003 per-
sonal injury plaintiffs in Illinois could potentially win a lawsuit against
36. 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 23/45 (2016).  This section allows for the person holding the lien to
initiate proceedings against the personal injury plaintiff if the entire total billed amount is not
satisfied after the lien is satisfied under the Act. Id.
37. Beard & Marsh, supra note 30, at 272.
38. Id.
39. “Health care liens” encompass the categories of health care professionals and health care
providers under 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 23 (2016).
40. The Clinical Psychologists Lien Act, 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10 (repealed 2003); The Den-
tists Lien Act, 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20 (repealed 2003); The Emergency Services Personnel Lien
Act, 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 22 (repealed 2003); The Home Health Agency Lien Act, 770 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 25 (repealed 2003); The Hospital Lien Act, 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35 (repealed
2003); The Optometrists Lien Act, 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 72 (repealed 2003); The Physical Thera-
pist Lien Act, 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75 (repealed 2003); The Physicians Lien Act, 770 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 80 (repealed 2003).
41. Burrell v. Southern Truss, 679 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ill. 1997).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1233–34.
44. Id. at 1233.
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a tortfeasor yet still not receive any compensation after accounting for
health care liens and the attorney’s fees.45
D. Enactment of the Illinois Health Care Services Lien Act
The legislative proceedings prior to the enactment of the Health
Care Services Lien Act were hotly debated.46  Senator John Cullerton,
the Senate representative speaking on behalf of the bill stated:
The reason for the bill is that . . . if [the liens are] not limited and
[health care providers are] . . . allowed to . . . apply their one-third
to the total judgment, you could have the entire potential judgment
locked up in liens, so that there’s no incentive for the injured party
to even bring the lawsuit in the first place.47
He further remarked that the Act was a response to Burrell, as he
explicitly stated that the Court incorrectly interpreted the prior medi-
cal lien statutes.48  Both the Illinois State Medical Society and the Illi-
nois Health and Hospital Association opposed the bill.49  Their
opposition to this bill was in large part due to the burdens it placed on
hospitals and doctors.50  Even stronger opposition existed in the
House of Representatives.  One representative went so far as to call
the  bill “for lawyers.”51  Many believed the bill put health care prov-
iders last, with no guarantee they would ever get paid for their ser-
vices.52  Despite strong opposition from both the House and Senate,
the Bill passed and was signed by the Governor on June 30, 2003.53
45. Id. at 1234.
46. S., Transcript of Debates, 93rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. Apr. 03, 2003).
47. Id. at 87–88.
48. Id. at 88.  Senator John Cullerton stated:
And this is what the practice was, where all of these were collectively read together and
it was – a total of one-third was their lien, up until this Burrell case, which came down a
few years ago, and the Supreme Court, on a five-to-four decision, read it differently,
and we’re trying to reverse that.
Id.
49. Id. at 85.  That these parties opposed the bill is no surprise.  The Illinois State Medical
Society represents the physicians of Illinois while the Illinois Health and Hospital Association
represents the hospitals of Illinois.  The previous interpretation of the various lien acts in Illinois,
as applied by Burrell, allowed for the possibility of significantly more compensation for the
groups these two entities represent.  Burrell v. Southern Truss, 679 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ill. 1997).
50. S., Transcript of Debates, 93rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 85 (Ill. Apr. 03, 2003).
51. H.R., Transcript of Debates, 93rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 33 (Ill. May 27, 2003).  For
a House breakdown on voting, see H.R., 93rd Gen. Assemb., (Ill. May 27, 2003), available at
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/votehistory/93/house/09300SB0274_05272003_005000T.pdf (vot-
ing list describing 77 yeas, 34 nays, and 3 present); for a Senate breakdown on voting, see S., 93rd
Gen. Assemb., (Ill. May 30, 2003), available at http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/votehistory/93/sen-
ate/09300SB0274_05302003_027000C.pdf (voting list describing 59 yeas, 0 nays, and 0 present).
52. See H.R., Transcript of Debates, 93rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 33 (Ill. May 27, 2003).
53. S. 274, 93rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2003).
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There are three major components to the Act.  The first component
describes the process by which health care providers and professionals
must assert liens.54  The second component creates the lien and limits
the amount that can be asserted.55  The Act provides that every health
care professional and provider who treats an injured person shall have
a lien upon all claims and causes of action for all reasonable charges.56
A health care provider is defined under the Act as any “licensed hos-
pital, licensed home health agency, licensed ambulatory surgical treat-
ment center, licensed long-term care facilities, or licensed emergency
medical services personnel.”57  Most importantly, the “total amount of
all liens under [the] Act shall not exceed 40%” of the plaintiff’s ver-
dict, judgment, award or settlement.58
The third component of the Act explains the rights of lienholders.
All lienholders under the Act share proportionate amounts within the
forty percent limitation.59  The limitations can only be waived or re-
duced by the lienholder.60  No individual from either the health care
professional category or health care provider category can receive
more than one-third of the verdict or judgment.61  The Act provides
special procedures for when the total amount of the liens asserted ex-
ceeds forty percent of the verdict or judgment.62  When this situation
arises, the health care professionals’ liens are split into a separate
group from the health care providers’ liens.  Thereafter, neither group
can recover more than twenty percent of the verdict.63  These proce-
dures are followed with a caveat that all liens under the Act are to be
satisfied “to the extent possible for all health care professionals and
providers by reallocating the amount unused within the aggregate to-
tal limitation of 40%.”64  The limit on any one individual lien asserted
under the Act remains one-third of the total judgment.65
Lastly, the Act provides further support for health care profession-
als and providers in Section 45.  This section provides that nothing in
54. 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 23/10(b) (2016).
55. 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 23/10(a) (2016).
56. Id.
57. 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 23/5 (2016).
58. 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 23/10(a) (2016); see infra notes 131–47 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining how, even in light of the plain language of the Act, the plaintiff’s compensation can
result in nothing after accounting for attorney’s fees and costs).




63. 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 23/10(c)(1) (2016).
64. Id.
65. Id.
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the Act should be construed as limiting the right of a health care pro-
fessional or provider to pursue collection of its reasonable charges for
the services it furnishes to the injured plaintiff.66  Thus, those asserting
liens under the Act are able to seek the amounts left over after the
verdict is dispersed.  The party seeking these residual funds can bring
a lawsuit, or any other lawful means of pursuing the amount, against
the plaintiff for the remaining amount of the charges.67  This section,
therefore, reflects the intent of the legislature to protect healthcare
providers and professionals.68
E. The 2012 Amendment
The Act was amended on August 21, 2012.69  When first introduced,
the amendment decreased the amount of money health care providers
and professionals could sue for if not fully compensated after the liens
had been fulfilled.70  The proposed language also provided that if
health insurance or private or public benefits were available to pay a
medical bill, the lien asserted under the Act would be limited to the
rates established by those benefits.71  After debates concerning the
proposed amendments, this limiting language was taken out before
the bill passed in the House of Representatives.72
The House gave no reasoning as to why the language was taken
out.73  However, the Illinois Health and Hospital Association, the Illi-
nois State Medical Society, and other associations in opposition to the
language of  the proposed amendment, were no longer opposed after
the limiting language was withdrawn.74  Through the 2012 Amend-
ment, the Illinois Legislature showed its willingness to amend the Act,
but not on terms helpful to personal injury plaintiffs.
F. Contesting Reasonableness of Charges
Similar to statutes in other states the Act does not define the “rea-
sonable charges” for the services rendered.75  The amount hospitals
bill for their services comes from the “chargemaster” list, which is not
66. 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 23/45 (2016).
67. Id.
68. S., Transcript of Debates, 93rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 85–86 (Ill. Apr. 03, 2003).
69. Illinois Health Care Services Lien Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 097-1042.
70. H.B. 5823, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2012).
71. Id.
72. H.R., Transcript of Debates, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 284–86 (Ill. Mar. 29, 2012).
73. Id. at 283.
74. Id. at 285–86.
75. 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 23 (2016); Beard & Marsh, supra note 30, at 273.
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required to be available to the public.76  Thus, establishing the “rea-
sonableness” of the charges is somewhat elementary for the hospital
as it simply entails the hospital administrator or physician testifying
that the charges are customary and reasonable; this testimony alone
typically suffices for proof of reasonableness.77  The impact of govern-
mental payors and private insurance on the reasonableness standard
has been applied inconsistently in the courts.78
Thus, plaintiffs wishing to contest the reasonableness of the charges
face a tall task.  The biggest obstacle in proving a charge was unrea-
sonable is presenting sufficient evidence undermining the
chargemaster rates of the hospital.79  Despite hospitals exerting near
total control in setting rates and even though industry experts have
acknowledged the prices are arbitrary,80 courts across the country
have upheld bloated rates.81  In addition to considering background
information regarding the chargemaster rates, some courts have ex-
amined the reasonableness of charges through expert testimony, in-
dustry custom, the prices charged by other hospitals in the
community, and amounts accepted by the hospitals from insurers and
governmental payors.82
The test for contesting the reasonableness of medical charges under
the Act has not been explicitly outlined by Illinois courts.  Prior to
passage of the Act, however, an Illinois appellate court recognized
that expert witness testimony could be sufficient to contest the reason-
ableness of the charges.83  Even in the absence of expert testimony
data has revealed the completely arbitrary nature of the charges.84
An alarming example of the disparities in medical charges was found
in joint replacement procedures for Medicare recipients: from
76. Reinhardt, supra note 31, at 58–59.
77. Beard & Marsh, supra note 30, at 272–73.
78. Id. at 273; see discussion infra notes 208–17 (describing Wills decision that allows for per-
sonal injury plaintiffs to present evidence of the full, non-discounted amount of their medical
bills to the court).
79. Beard & Marsh, supra note 30, at 276–77.
80. Reinhardt, supra note 31, at 58–59; see also James McGrath, Overcharging the Uninsured
in Hospitals: Shifting a Greater Share of Uncompensated Medical Care Costs to the Federal Gov-
ernment, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 173, 184–85 (2007).
81. Beard & Marsh, supra note 30, at 277–81.
82. Id. at 278–79.
83. Temesvary v. Houdek, 703 N.E.2d 613 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (holding that, under the Physi-
cian’s Lien Act, the trial court decision to reduce the doctor’s lien based off expert testimony
was against the manifest weight of evidence).
84. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE PROVIDER UTILIZATION
AND PAYMENT DATA: INPATIENT (last modified Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.cms.gov/Research-
Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/Medicare-Provider-Charge-Data/
Inpatient.html.
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$5,304.00 in Oklahoma to $223,373.00 in California.85  Plaintiffs in Illi-
nois face an uphill climb in order to successfully contest the substan-
tial chargemaster rates.
G. Attorney Compensation, the Common Fund Doctrine,
and the Act
The Illinois Attorneys Lien Act governs the liens asserted by attor-
neys.86  How these liens attach is no different than the way in which
they attach under the Act.  The Attorneys Lien Act generally provides
that attorneys shall have a lien upon all claims for an amount previ-
ously agreed upon by the attorney and client.87  In the absence of an
explicit agreement the lien amount will be the reasonable fees associ-
ated with such suits, plus costs and expenses.88  Specifically, the Attor-
neys Lien Act provides that when all liens under the Health Care
Services Lien Act meet or exceed forty percent of the recovery, the
total amount of all liens under the Attorneys Lien Act shall not ex-
ceed thirty percent.89  In this circumstance, all attorneys must share
proportionate amounts within the thirty percent statutory limitation.90
Illinois courts provided further protection for health care providers
and professionals in their interpretation of the Health Care Services
Lien Act in relation to the common fund doctrine.91  The common
fund doctrine provides that a party who creates, preserves, or in-
creases the value of a fund in which others have an ownership interest,
be reimbursed from that fund.92  As applied to attorneys, those who
recover a common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself
or the client are entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee from the fund
as a whole.93  The rationale for reimbursing attorneys from a common
fund is that unless the costs of litigation are spread to the beneficiaries
85. Wilson Andrews et al., Disparity in Medical Billing, WASH. POST (May 8, 2013), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/national/actual-cost-of-medical-care/; Sarah Kliff &
Dan Keating, One Hospital Charges $8,000–Another, $38,000, WASH. POST (May 8, 2013), https:/
/www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/05/08/one-hospital-charges-8000-another-38000/
?utm_term=.8b4870105fdc.




90. Id.  Altogether, the plaintiff would relinquish seventy percent of his damages award in this
circumstance.
91. Wendling v. S. Ill. Hosp. Servs., 950 N.E.2d 646, 647 (Ill. 2011).
92. Scholtens v. Schneider, 671 N.E.2d 657, 662 (Ill. 1996).
93. Id.
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of the fund, those beneficiaries will be unjustly enriched by the attor-
ney’s efforts throughout the litigation.94
The Illinois Supreme Court in 2011 analyzed whether or not a hos-
pital should be required to contribute to the common fund in relation
to the Act.95  The Illinois Supreme Court in Wendling held that the
common fund doctrine is not applicable to health care liens under the
Act.96  The court relied almost exclusively on precedent, noting that
Illinois courts had never applied the common fund doctrine to a credi-
tor-debtor relationship, which is exactly the relationship between the
lienholder hospitals and the personal injury plaintiffs.97  The Court
also relied upon  analysis from courts in other states that held the
common fund doctrine should not apply to similar situations.98
The Court in Wendling held the hospitals were not unjustly en-
riched and therefore the common fund doctrine did not apply, be-
cause their claims for services rendered were not contingent on the
personal injury plaintiff’s rights against a third party or the creation of
a fund.99  The court reasoned that because the hospitals’ claims ex-
isted irrespective of the outcome of the lawsuit, the hospitals did not
directly benefit from the efforts of the plaintiff’s attorneys.100  Despite
the Wendling court’s assurance that their holding was grounded in
precedent and sound logic, its decision has been criticized.101  The
Court’s decision in Wendling operates to allow hospitals to retain even
more compensation after a judgment is obtained.
H. Medicare and Medicaid
Medicare is a federal program created to provide health care to eld-
erly and disabled persons.102  The Medicare system provides hospitals
with a predetermined cost for the services they provide to a patient.103
94. Id. at 663.
95. Wendling v. S. Ill. Hosp. Servs., 950 N.E.2d 646, 647 (Ill. 2011).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 648.  The Court mentioned the following as controlling precedent:  Watkins v.
GMAC Fin. Servs., 785 N.E.2d 40 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); Vill. of Clarendon Hills v. Mulder, 663
N.E.2d 435 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Wheaton v. Dep’t of Pub. Aid, 416 N.E.2d 780 (Ill. App. Ct.
1981).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 651.
100. Id.
101. See Ayla Ellison, Physical and Financial Injuries: The Common Fund Doctrine and its
Application under the Illinois Health Care Services Lien Act, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 305, 320,
324–25 (2014) for a comprehensive analysis of Wendling, the common fund doctrine, and a cri-
tique of the current system in Illinois.
102. Beard & Marsh, supra note 30, at 267.
103. Daniel L. Saar, Note, Blindsided (Again): Iowa Hospitals’ Abuse of the Hospital Lien
Statute and What Has Been Done to Correct It, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 463, 474 (2008).
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The payment is then determined by the “diagnosis-related group”
formula.104  The results are reduced payments per Medicare benefici-
ary, and in turn the hospitals providing these services are paid less
than the costs of their services.105 Additionally, the Medicare Secon-
dary Payer Act disallows Medicare payment for any service when pay-
ment “has been made or can reasonably be expected to be made. . . .
under an automobile or liability insurance policy or plan (including a
self-insured plan) or under no fault insurance.”106  Further, the Cen-
ters for Medicare and Medicaid Services has a right of action to re-
cover payment from any entity, including a beneficiary, provider,
physician, or attorney.107
The Illinois Medicaid program is codified in the Illinois Public Aid
Code.108  Medicaid provides health insurance for the state’s insol-
vent.109  Pertinent to this discussion, the Code provides that the Illi-
nois Department of Healthcare and Family Services has a “charge
upon all claims, demands, and causes of action for injuries” to some-
one who has applied for or received financial aid, including health
care benefits.110  Additionally, the charges, demands, or causes of ac-
tion under which Medicaid has a lien take priority over all other liens
that exist under Illinois law.111  Therefore, in a case where various par-
ties have filed liens under the Act, including services rendered under
the Illinois Public Aid Code, the charges for Medicaid services are not
included in the Act’s computation.112
104. Id.
105. Id.  For instance, “As a result of this reduced payment per beneficiary, Iowa hospitals are
paid $588 less per Medicare case than other Midwestern states and $1,020 less per Medicare case
than the national average.” Id.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2012).  A Medicare Secondary Payer “is the term gener-
ally used when the Medicare program does not have primary payment responsibility – that is,
when another entity has the responsibility for paying before Medicare.”  Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services, Medicare Secondary Payor, https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coordination-of-
Benefits-and-Recovery/Coordination-of-Benefits-and-Recovery-Overview/Medicare-Secondary-
Payer/Medicare-Secondary-Payer.html.  In other words, Medicare is a secondary payor when the
Medicare beneficiary’s hospital bill is covered by liability insurance.
107. 42 C.F.R. § 411.24(g) (2012).
108. 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-22 (2016).
109. Beard & Marsh, supra note 30, at 269.
110. 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-22 (2016).
111. Id.  The exception to this priority system is the attorney’s lien under the Attorney’s Lien
Act.  “This Section shall not affect the priority of an attorney’s lien under the Attorney’s Lien
Act.”
112. McKim v. S. Ill. Hosp. Servs., 61 N.E.3d 946 (Ill App. Ct. 2016).
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III. ANALYSIS
Section A analyzes Illinois case law and how judicial interpretation
of the Act has created barriers to lawsuits.  These cases address the
issue of whether medical providers must bill the health insurance of
the insured.  The argument is that medical providers must do this be-
cause plaintiffs are third-party beneficiaries of the insurance contracts.
Section B then analyzes the interplay between attorneys fees, the
common fund doctrine, and the Act illustrating the fact that Illinois
courts have been reluctant to agree to fee-shifting at the expense of
medical providers.  Next, Section C analyzes whether attorneys fees
and costs should be deducted from the lien amount under the Act
before adjudicating the liens.  Section D then analyzes the impact of
Medicare and Medicaid on the Act, showing that courts have found in
favor of plaintiffs on a small number of issues here, but the key and
most costly issues still favor medical providers.  Section E discusses
those small victories for personal injury plaintiffs, primarily the collat-
eral source rule as applied to Medicare and Medicaid discounts.
Lastly, Section F discusses the HMO Act, its application to medical
liens prior to and after 2003, and how Illinois courts have inconsis-
tently applied it to the detriment of personal injury plaintiffs.
A. Should Hospitals be Required to Bill Health Insurance
Companies?
Despite the Act’s pro-plaintiff purpose,113 Illinois courts have con-
siderably broadened its scope and rejected virtually every argument
for limiting lien amounts that health care providers and professionals
assert and receive.114  Plaintiffs attorneys recognize the potential for
abuse of the Act by health care providers and professionals, but advo-
cacy for change has been unsuccessful.115  What results is the evil the
legislature sought to prevent: plaintiffs are disincentivized from bring-
ing suit.116
113. “The reason for the bill is that if . . . [the liens] are not limited and [hospitals and health
care providers] are allowed to apply their one-third to the total judgment, you could have the
entire potential judgment locked up in liens.”  S., Transcript of Debates, 93rd Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess., at 87 (Ill. Apr. 03, 2003).
114. See infra notes 126–280 and accompanying text.
115. See Dennis Berkbigler, A Strategy for Dealing with Medical Providers Who Refuse to
Submit their Bills to Health Insurance, ILL. STATE BAR ASSOC. (Feb. 2012), https://www.isba.org/
sections/tortlaw/newsletter/2012/02/astrategyfordealingwithmedicalprovi for a common example
of a plaintiffs attorney’s letter to health care providers regarding assertion of liens under the Act.
116. Id. at 85.  “So the problem is that there’s not even an incentive to go out and bring the
case in the first place.” Id. at 87–88.
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Perhaps the strongest and most common sense argument for the
reduction of the amount that lienholders are entitled to under the Act
arises in the Premovic’s situation discussed above.  In 2016 an Illinois
appellate court decided a case that was essentially identical.117  The
plaintiff in Barry sustained injuries in an automobile accident and re-
ceived medical treatment from the defendant hospital.118  The plaintiff
had health insurance through his employer; the defendant had a con-
tract with a third party that provided plaintiff’s health insurance was
to receive a discount from the defendant for the medical bills.119
However, despite this agreement the defendant did not submit the
bills to plaintiff’s insurer, and thus the plaintiff was not given dis-
counted rates.120
The Barry court considered and rejected plaintiff’s claims for re-
lief.121  In its reasoning, the court quoted section 23/10(a) of the Act,
noting that the plain language allowed hospitals to place liens on all
patients’ claims and causes of action.122  The plaintiff contended the
hospital must bill the patient’s health insurance before pursuing a
lien.123  According to the court, the Act does not limit the ability of
hospitals and health care professionals to assert liens to situations
where the patient is without health insurance or where no agreement
exists between the provider and the insurance company for discounted
rates.124
The court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims for breach
of contract.125  In that claim the plaintiff alleged the consent form
signed upon arrival at the hospital was a contract and the hospital
breached that contract by failing to bill the insurance company.126
The court noted that “the consent form simply authorizes [the hospi-
tal] to bill [the insurance company],” therefore failure to do so was not
a breach.127
117. Barry v. St. Mary’s Hosp. Decatur, 68 N.E.3d 964 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
118. Id. at 966.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 977.  Plaintiff pled causes of action for consumer fraud, breach of contract, third-
party beneficiary, and unjust enrichment. Id. at 970.
122. Barry, 68 N.E.3d at 970–71.
123. Id. at 971
124. Id.  “The General Assembly could have included such language in the Lien Act, but it
did not.  We will not depart from the plain language of a statute by reading into it exceptions,
limitations, or conditions the legislature did not itself express.”
125. Id.
126. Id. at 975.
127. Barry, 68 N.E.3d at 975.
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The court was also unpersuaded by the plaintiff’s stronger claim,
that it was a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the hospi-
tal and the insurance company.128  The court held dispositive an ex-
press disclaimer between the hospital and the insurance company that
stated nothing in the agreement could create any additional rights or
remedies for a third party.129
In Barry, the court failed to take into account the expectation and
reliance interests of the plaintiff.  This idea of reliance has emerged
due to the progression of notions of fairness within the landscape of
health insurance.  Due in large part to the Affordable Care Act, the
number of citizens without health insurance has steadily decreased.130
At the beginning of 2016, only 9.4% of persons in the United States
were uninsured.131  The number uninsured in Illinois is 7.1%.132  If
citizens are mandated to purchase health insurance, it would seem
that fairness requires health care providers to submit bills to the
health insurance companies.133
The Barry decision is the prototypical Illinois case because it nega-
tively affects personal injury plaintiffs with insurance coverage.  Illi-
nois courts have continuously pointed out what is missing from the
Act: it does not limit a provider’s ability to place liens on a plaintiff’s
settlement to situations (1) where the plaintiff does not have health
insurance, or (2) where there is no agreement between the health care
provider and the plaintiff’s insurer for a discounted rate.134  In other
words, the Illinois legislature could have exempted these situations
from the lien attachment process, but chose not to.135
This method of statutory interpretation, adhering to the plain mean-
ing of the language of the statute, is well-grounded in the Illinois judi-
ciary.136  However, critics of the plain meaning rule primarily argue
that the rule focuses on the statutory language to the detriment of its
128. Id.
129. Id. at 976.
130. Margot Sanger-Katz & Quoctrung Bui, The Impact of Obamacare in Four Maps, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 31, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/10/31/upshot/up-uninsured-
2016.html.
131. Lisa Schencker, Uninsured Rate Drops Again in Illinois After Obamacare Takes Effect,
CHI. TRIBUNE (Sept. 13, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-census-uninsured-
obamacare-0914-biz-20160913-story.html.
132. Id.
133. Indeed, the Premovics encountered this exact situation. See supra notes 1–12 and accom-
panying text.
134. Barry, 68 N.E.3d at 970–71.
135. Id.
136. Matthew Hertko, Statutory Interpretation in Illinois: Abandoning the Plain Meaning Rule
for an Extratextual Approach, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 377, 379 (2005).
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purpose.137  Illinois courts’ adherence to the plain meaning rule ig-
nores the purpose of the Act. Using a method of statutory interpreta-
tion that focuses instead on both the statutory language and the
expressed purpose of the statute would lead to results that benefit per-
sonal injury plaintiffs, instead of the current landscape which almost
exclusively benefits health care lienholders.138  The law as it stands
drastically disincentivizes personal injury plaintiffs from bringing suit
and when they do, their compensation is greatly reduced.  This uneven
playing field is the direct result of Illinois’ refusal to require health
care providers and professionals to bill plaintiff’s health insurance.
B. Attorneys Fees and the Common Fund Doctrine
Plaintiffs attorneys have argued that the common fund doctrine
should apply to health care providers and professionals holding liens
under the Act.139  The idea that these entities should contribute to
attorneys fees finds support in some jurisdictions.140  One of the main
reasons behind requiring these entities to contribute to the common
fund doctrine is to prevent unjust enrichment.141  The Alaska Su-
preme Court, in Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium, reasoned
that “it would be unfair to allow the [hospital] to collect on its health
care provider lien without paying a pro rata share of attorney’s fees
when, without the common fund created by the plaintiff’s lawyers, the
[hospital] would have nothing upon which to enforce its lien.”142  In
essence, because the hospital was ready and willing to benefit from
the common fund, in turn it must also pay a fair share of the expenses
used to obtain the fund.143  The Illinois Supreme Court in Wendling,
137. Id. at 384.
138. Using an approach like this would provide plaintiff-friendly results that the legislature
intended when enacting the Act in 2003.  For example, one of the major expressed reasons for
enactment was the Illinois Supreme Court decision in Burrell v. Southern Truss, 679 N.E.2d 1230
(Ill. 1997).  That decision allowed health care lienholders under the previous laws to completely
subsume all of the plaintiff’s recovery at trial, leading to the result of no compensation.  Taking
this background into account, the state of the law prior to enactment in 2003, the legislatures
expressly avowed purpose behind the Act, and the language of the Act itself, surely a different
decision could have been reached in the Barry case that would better comport with the purpose
of the Act.
139. Wendling v. S. Ill. Hosp. Servs., 950 N.E.2d 646 (Ill. 2011).
140. Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium v. Settlement Funds Held for or to Be Paid on
Behalf of E.R. ex rel. Ridley, 84 P.3d 418 (Alaska 2004); Martinez v. St. Joseph Healthcare Sys.,
871 P.2d 1363 (N.M. 1994).
141. Alaska Native, 84 P.3d at 434.  Unjust enrichment occurs when a benefit is conferred
upon a party, the party appreciated the benefit, and it would be inequitable for the receiving
party to accept and retain the benefit without compensating the conferring party for the value of
the benefit. Id. at 432.
142. Id.
143. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\67-1\DPL101.txt unknown Seq: 18  5-JAN-18 15:14
122 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:105
by contrast, reasoned that because the hospital’s claims were not con-
tingent on the plaintiffs’ rights against a third party, the hospitals were
not unjustly enriched even though they did not contribute to the com-
mon fund.144
The court in Martinez, albeit indirectly and writing nearly twenty
years prior, addressed the underlying justifications for not applying
the common fund doctrine.145  It stated that the hospital’s right to as-
sert and enforce liens is dependent on obtaining a judgment or settle-
ment.146  The proceeds from the judgment or settlement operate as a
fund and without the fund hospitals have nothing upon which to assert
a lien under the Act.147  When hospitals seek payment from the fund
through the lien they directly receive the benefits of the work done by
the plaintiff’s attorney.  Further, the hospitals benefit from the plain-
tiff’s decision to bear the initial expenses and risks of litigation.148
Attorney Ayla Ellison examined the relationship between the com-
mon fund doctrine and the Act, including proposed amendments.149
Ellison applied the existing Illinois law of unjust enrichment to the
Act and arrived at a conclusion more analogous to Alaska and Marti-
nez than to the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Wendling.150  The
Illinois Supreme Court has articulated the elements of unjust enrich-
ment as follows: (1) the defendant unjustly retained a benefit (2) to
the plaintiff’s detriment, and (3) the defendant’s retention of that ben-
efit violates the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good
conscience.151  For claims involving the unjust enrichment of hospitals,
the key contested element is what constitutes a “benefit.”  Illinois has
recognized three general categories of benefits.152  The first category
is “money had and received,”153 which occurs when the defendant re-
ceives money owed to another plaintiff.154  The second category oc-
curs when the defendant has received services that were not paid
144. Wendling, 950 N.E.2d at 651.
145. Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1363.
146. Id. at 1366.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Ellison, supra note 110, at 326–28.
150. Id. at 320–26.
151. HPI Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Hosp., Inc., 545 N.E.2d 672, 679 (Ill. 1989).
152. Ronald M. Lepinskas, Unjust Enrichment Claims in Illinois: Applying a Venerable Doc-
trine to Modern Disputes, 91 ILL. B.J. 514, 516 (2003).
153. Board of Highway Comm’rs, Bloomington Twp. v. City of Bloomington, 97 N.E. 280, 283
(Ill. 1911).
154. Ellison, supra note 110, at 322.
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for.155  The third category is “extinguishment of liability,” where a
plaintiff pays a debt or prevents a financial loss for the defendant.156
Each definition of benefit can be applied to the Act.157  The first
category applies because the hospital is receiving money owed to the
plaintiff.  Although the plaintiff owes a debt to the hospital, the judg-
ment or settlement received by the plaintiff in the lawsuit is owed to
the plaintiff, not the hospital.158  The second category applies, as
shown by jurisdictions that recognize the common fund doctrine ap-
plies to these relationships.  The money is rightly owed to personal
injury plaintiffs because the plaintiff expended funds to retain an at-
torney, and without the efforts of the plaintiff and attorney no fund
would exist.159  The third category also applies to the hospital-patient
relationship as the hospital’s monetary recovery based on the attor-
ney’s work prevents a financial loss for the hospital.160  Thus, under
the categories of benefits recognized by Illinois courts, a hospital is
unjustly enriched under the Act regardless of whether a debt is owed
to the hospital.161  The trial court in Wendling agreed with Ellison’s
analysis and held that the common fund doctrine applied to the hospi-
tal-patient relationship.162  The Wendling trial court was true to the
policy underlying the common fund doctrine in Illinois: prevention of
freeloading.163
Prevention of freeloading can be achieved by amending the Act to
require hospitals to contribute to attorneys’ fees when the plaintiff’s
attorney recovers a monetary award.164  Jurisdictions that require hos-
pitals to contribute to attorney fees use a pro rata share formula,
which ensures hospitals only contribute an amount proportional to
their recovery.165  Any other equation could lead to the plaintiff being
unjustly enriched as a result of the hospital paying more than its pro-
portionate share.166  The appellate court in Wendling frustrated the
purpose of the Act, which was to encourage personal injury plaintiffs
to bring suit.  This amendment would allow for more substantial re-
155. Hoban v. Strata Mktg., Inc., 1991 WL 206151, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 8, 1991).





161. Id. at 322–23.
162. Ellison, supra note 110, at 324.
163. Brase v. Loempker, 642 N.E.2d 202, 205 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
164. Ellison, supra note 110, at 327.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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covery by personal injury plaintiffs, encouraging them to bring suit.167
Accordingly, the Illinois legislature should strongly consider this
amendment.
C. Attorney’s Fees and Costs, and the Judgment
Personal injury plaintiffs have also argued that attorney’s fees and
costs should be deducted from the total settlement or judgment before
any liens asserted under the Act are adjudicated.168  Adopting this
view would result in increased recovery for plaintiffs because it de-
creases the likelihood that a judgment would be completely subsumed
by attorney’s compensation and health care liens under the Act.169
This argument is derived from the purported rationale behind the
Act; ensuring plaintiffs are incentivized to bring lawsuits.  Otherwise
the total judgment could be reduced by seventy percent.170  In Stanton
v. Rea, the jury awarded the plaintiff $13,506.80.171  First, the attor-
ney’s lien of thirty percent was deducted from the total judgment, re-
ducing the amount to $9,005.36.172  Next, forty percent was taken out
pursuant to the Act for the hospital’s liens, reducing the amount to
$3,602.96.173  Since the cost to secure the judgment was $4,501.44,
“there was literally no money left for plaintiff.”174
The appellate court noted that the plaintiff receiving nothing from
the judgment was not in line with the intent of the Act.175  Thus, to
ensure plaintiffs receive their thirty percent of the judgment as in-
tended by the Act and the Attorneys Lien Act, the forty percent of
167. After all, if Ellison’s framework were adopted, personal injury plaintiff’s compensation
would increase, as plaintiff’s attorneys would be compensated in part by health care lienholders
under the Act.
168. Stanton v. Rea, 978 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
169. Indeed, the plaintiff in Stanton had her entire judgment taken away after liens and attor-
ney’s fees were subtracted. Id.  This was one of the main reasons the fifth district appellate court
overruled the trial court and held that the attorney’s fees were to be subtracted before liens are
adjudicated.  When the costs of obtaining judgments are high, allowing attorney’s fees to be
reduced before adjudication of liens can greatly increase a plaintiff’s compensation, depending
on the amount of costs.
170. Id. at 1150 (“The Act is clear that lienholders are limited to 40% of the judgment or
settlement and that if they in fact receive 40% of the judgment or settlement, then any attorney’s
liens are limited to 30%.  Accordingly, the Act specifically limits the liens upon a judgment or
settlement to 70%.”).
171. Id. at 1149.
172. Id. at 1150.
173. Id.
174. Stanton, 978 N.E.2d at 1151.
175. Id (“However, because of the high costs it took to secure a judgment, there was literally
no money left for plaintiff. . . . After a careful reading of the Act, we agree this was not the
intention of our General Assembly.”).
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liens asserted by health care providers and professionals should not be
computed until all attorney costs are deducted.176
Continuing the trend of disfavoring personal injury plaintiff recov-
ery, the Illinois Supreme Court in McVey v. M.L.K. Enterprises,
L.L.C. overruled Stanton.177  In doing so the court relied upon a strict
reading of the Act.178  The court noted that “every time the legislature
sets forth a percentage limitation in [section 10 of the Act], it refers
back to and requires the calculation be based on the ‘verdict, judg-
ment, award, settlement or compromise’” with no qualifier.179  Fur-
ther, the court reasoned that a holding otherwise would have been
inconsistent with the decision in Wendling.180  The decisions in McVey
and Wendling are especially troubling to prospective plaintiffs as the
court has now approved of situations in which a plaintiff’s judgment
can be completely subsumed by medical liens and attorney’s fees and
costs.
Instead of being made whole, personal injury plaintiffs find them-
selves increasingly at risk for zero recovery, even though they should
be protected from this adverse outcome.181  Furthermore, plaintiffs
with Medicare or Medicaid coverage are potentially even more re-
stricted in their recovery.
D. The Impact of Medicare and Medicaid
When the Act is applied to situations involving Medicare or Medi-
caid the results are inconsistent.182  In a 2016 decision an Illinois ap-
pellate court considered whether Medicare and Medicaid payments
are included in the forty percent calculation under the Act.183  In Mc-
Kim v. Southern Illinois Hospital Services, the plaintiff reached a set-
tlement with the tortfeasor for $16,000.184  The plaintiff had Medicare,
176. Id.
177. McVey v. M.L.K. Enters., L.L.C., 32 N.E.3d 1112 (Ill. 2015).
178. Id. at 1115–16. See also Wendling, 950 N.E.2d 646; Barry, 68 N.E.3d 964.
179. Id. at 1116.  The court here appears to be saying that since the legislature did not say the
calculation should be based on part of a verdict, judgment, award, settlement or compromise,
then it must be inferred that the legislature intended the calculation to be based on the whole
verdict, judgment, award settlement or compromise.
180. Id. at 1117.  “[P]laintiff, by seeing to have her attorney fees and costs subtracted from the
total settlement prior to the calculation of the healthcare services lien, is asking us to improperly
shift some of her attorney fees and litigation costs onto the hospital.” Id.
181. Lars Noah, Comfortably Numb: Medicalizing (and Mitigating) Pain-and-Suffering Dam-
ages, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 431, 432–33 (2009).
182. Compare Wills v. Foster, 892 N.E.2d 1018 (Ill. 2008), with McKim v. S. Ill. Hosp. Servs.,
61 N.E.3d 946 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
183. McKim, 61 N.E.3d at 950.
184. Id. at 948.
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Medicaid, Medicare Part D, hospital, and ambulance liens against his
settlement.185  After adjudicating the liens, the plaintiff’s thirty per-
cent share was $4,800.186  On appeal, the court held that the Medicare,
Medicare Part D, and Medicaid payments did not fall under the Act.
Thus, according to the court, only the hospital and ambulance service
amounts should have been included in the forty percent lien calcula-
tion for health care professionals and providers.187  The court rea-
soned that by including these public agency payments, the trial court
incorrectly found that these entities were health care professionals or
health care providers for purposes of the Act.188  This determination
by the court reduced the plaintiff’s recovery from $4,800.00 to
$3,027.35.189  The two lienholders that the court recognized under the
Act were given increased recovery.190  The court considered, and re-
185. Id. 948–49.
186. Id.  It may be helpful to view the multiple lienholders as follows:
McKim (Plaintiff) $4,800.00
Attorney $4,800.00 plus $494.93.00 in costs
Herrin Hospital $2,421.94 (gross bill of $5,803.00; received
$2,812.94 share less $391.00 in costs)
Williamson County Ambulance $643.81 (gross bill of $1530.00; received
$747.74 share less $103.93 in costs)
Medicare $158.30
Medicaid $221.41
Medicare Part D $2459.61
Id.
187. Id. at 950–51.
188. McKim, 61 N.E.3d at 950–51.  “Medicare and Medicaid are public agencies and do not
directly provide medical care to the patient.  Instead, these agencies reimburse health care pro-
fessionals and providers.  We find that the statutory definitions of a ‘health care professional’
and a ‘health care provider’ are unambiguous.” Id.
189. Id. at 954.  The court also reversed the trial court’s grant of attorneys costs to be appor-
tioned from the hospital and ambulance services, as the decisions in Wendling v. Southern Illi-
nois Hospital Services and McVey v. M.L.K. Enterprises, LLC were directly contradictory to
apportioning attorneys costs between lienholders. Id. at 953–54.
190. Again, a chart is helpful to see the new breakdowns in recoveries between the parties.
McKim (plaintiff) $3,027.35
Attorney $4,800.00
Health Care Services Lien Act Lienholders $5,333.33
Herrin Hospital $4,218.66
Williamson County Ambulance $1,114.67
Medicare $158.30
Medicaid $221.41
Medicare Part D $2459.61
Id. at 954.
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jected, the plaintiff’s argument that the 2013 Amendment to the Act
barred the result.191
The result in McKim is anomalous to the goals of the Act and to
recipients of Medicare and Medicaid.  The recipients of Medicare and
Medicaid are often the most vulnerable.192  By not including Medicare
and Medicaid payments in the forty percent lien cap under the Act,
Illinois courts have disregarded the needs of those that may need com-
plete recovery the most.
Despite the fact that Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries may have
the most compelling case for being afforded complete recovery at the
expense of the health care lienholder, the Illinois judiciary in McKim
has created another barrier for similarly situated personal injury plain-
tiffs considering a lawsuit.
E. Small Victories for Personal Injury Plaintiffs
Not all judicial decisions have erected barriers to bringing suit for
personal injury plaintiffs.193  The biggest victory for plaintiffs came
when the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the “collateral source
rule” in relation to discounts through Medicare and Medicaid pay-
ments.194  The collateral source rule states that benefits received by
the injured party from a source independent of the tortfeasor will not
diminish damages otherwise recoverable from that tortfeasor.195
These benefits do not reduce the defendant’s tort liability even though
they do reduce the plaintiff’s loss.196  Typically the collateral source
191. Id. at 951–52.  The plaintiff argued that because the 2013 Amendment included subroga-
tion into the Act, it followed that Medicare, Medicare Part D, and Medicaid claims would then
fall under the Act as well. McKim, 61 N.E.3d at 951–52.  The court struck back, stating “Even if
we assumed that Medicare and Medicaid held subrogation interests, this section is preempted by
the Medicare Secondary Payer Act and conflicts with the Public Aid Code, and it therefore does
not apply in this case.” Id.  Indeed, the court found that the federal Medicare Secondary Payer
Act preempted the Health Care Services Lien Act. Id. at 951.  “Interpreting the Health Care
Services Lien Act to include Medicare and Medicare Part D bills within the statutory 40% limit
creates a conflict between that act and the Medicare Secondary Payer Act.  Therefore, the fed-
eral statute preempts the state statute. Id.
192. Jacobson et. al, Income and Assets of Medicare Beneficiaries, 2014-2030, KAISER FAMILY
FOUNDATION (Sept. 10, 2015), http://kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/income-and-assets-of-medicare
-beneficiaries-2014-2030/.
193. These victories, for the most part, are unlikely to occur often enough, and contain large
enough sums of money, to make a difference in deciding whether to bring suit against a
tortfeasor.
194. See Wills v. Foster, 892 N.E.2d 1018 (Ill. 2008).
195. Arthur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847, 851 (Ill. 2005).
196. Id.
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will have a lien or subrogation right to prevent such a double
recovery.197
In Wills v. Foster, the plaintiff sustained medical bills totaling
$80,163.47 arising out of an automobile accident.198  After Medicare
and Medicaid discounts were applied, the medical bills were reduced
to $19,005.50.199  This amount was then paid by Medicare and Medi-
caid on the plaintiff’s behalf.200  The plaintiff moved to prevent the
defendant from introducing evidence that the medical bills were dis-
counted and paid for by Medicare and Medicaid.  The defendant
moved to limit evidence to only the paid amount of the bills,
$19,005.50.201  The Illinois Supreme Court held that a plaintiff is enti-
tled to recover the full billed medical expenses, regardless of whether
they were paid or discounted by private insurance or covered by a
government program.202  Therefore, the plaintiff need only establish
the reasonableness of the medical bills in order to place the entire
amount of those bills into evidence.203  The Wills decision allows for
personal injury plaintiffs to present evidence of the full, non-dis-
counted amount of their medical bills to the court.204
While Wills seems to increase potential recovery under the Act, this
possibility is tempered by McKim.  Under the collateral source rule
plaintiffs are entitled to recover the full billed medical expenses in-
curred.  However, in the event that health care liens are adjudicated
by the court under the Act, those public program payments are ex-
cluded under McKim.205  In other words, plaintiffs cannot include ex-
penses incurred through public programs in the “pool” of money
existing for health care providers and professionals.206  Thus, health
197. Wills, 892 N.E.2d at 1022.  The notion of a double recovery stems from the fact that the
plaintiff, receiving compensation from a third-party source, might also receive that same amount
from the tortfeasor through a judgment.  The double recovery does not occur because a lien or
subrogation right for the “doubled” amounts is placed against the plaintiff.




202. Id. at 1030.
203. Wills, 892 N.E.2d at 1031.
204. See Ben Bridges, Clarifying ‘King Arthur’s Court:’ Making Sense of the Collateral Source
rule in Illinois After Wills v. Foster, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 747 (2010) (providing a comprehensive
analysis of the collateral source rule in Illinois, including the impact of Wills v. Foster.).
205. The action in McKim was an adjudication of liens under the Act. McKim, 61 N.E.3d at
946.  At issue in Wills was whether or not under the collateral source rule the plaintiff was
excluded from introducing into evidence the entire billed amount of expenses, regardless of
whether they had been paid by a third-party. Wills, 892 N.E.2d at 1020.
206. See 770 ILL. COMP STAT. 23/10 (2016).
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care providers and professionals recover more because there are
fewer entities to divide a pro-rata share of the plaintiff’s judgment.207
F. Guaranteed Recovery and Possible Violations of HMO Act
Instead of using liens as protection for treating insolvent and unin-
sured patients, hospitals are using them to maximize profits.  The pri-
mary vehicle for doing so is a veil of secrecy—the chargemaster rates.
Specifically, personal injury plaintiffs have an increasingly difficult
time rebutting and establishing charges were unreasonable.  The out-
come is that those paying for insurance may be paying for nothing and
those uninsured will likely not be made whole due to the inflated and
arbitrary chargemaster rates.208
Hospitals and healthcare professionals assert liens under the Act
because  it allows them to charge and collect inflated rates for ser-
vices.  However, this guaranteed recovery of the statutorily defined
amount in the Act was not what the Illinois House of Representatives
expected when debating the passage of the Act.209  Additionally, the
Illinois HMO Act provides a statutory rebuttal to the strict reading of
the Health Care Services Lien Act.210  Under the HMO Act, an “or-
ganization” is defined as:
any insurance company, a nonprofit corporation authorized under
the Dental Service Plan Act or the Voluntary Health Services Plans
Act, or a corporation organized under the laws of this or another
state for the purpose of operating one or more health care plans and
doing no business other than that of a Health Maintenance Organi-
zation or an insurance company.211
The definition of an organization under the HMO Act decidedly helps
those personal injury plaintiffs that argue hospitals should bill their
insurance companies before asserting liens under the Health Care Ser-
vices Lien Act.212  The HMO Act further defines “provider” as “any
physician, hospital facility, facility licensed under the Nursing Home
Care Act, or other person which is licensed or otherwise authorized to
furnish health care services and also includes any other entity that ar-
207. Id.
208. Beard & Marsh, supra note 30, at 284.
209. H.R., Transcript of Debates, 93rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 39 (Ill. May 27, 2003).
“[M]ost health care providers don’t actually file a lien. . .if they believe that their patient or
patients might be able to pay this.  They file the liens in the cases where. . .there is. . . a lawsuit
and they probably will not get paid.” Id.
210. See 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 125 (2016).
211. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 125/1-2(11) (2016).
212. See Overley, supra note 5.  This situation is not unlike the Premovics’, in which they
argued that NorthShore University HealthSystem was required to bill their insurance company,
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Illinois.  Id.
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ranges for the delivery or furnishing of health care service.”213  This
definition fits within the definitions of hospitals and health care pro-
fessionals under the Health Care Services Lien Act.214
The HMO Act requires the contracts between organizations and
providers contain a hold-harmless clause.215  The effect of this lan-
guage is such that personal injury plaintiffs who are enrolled in a
health care plan with the organization are “enrollees” under this sec-
tion.  In turn, enrollees are protected by the language of the section
that states that the provider, who is the hospital or health care profes-
sional, cannot seek any type of payment or have any recourse against
the plaintiff for services covered by the insurance organization (except
for co-payments and deductibles).216  Further, the section also states
that “[t]he organization’s enrollees, the persons acting on the en-
rollee’s behalf (other than the organization) and the employer or
group contract holder shall be third party beneficiaries of this
clause.”217  This language explicitly appears to rebut Illinois courts’
contentions that personal injury plaintiffs are not the intended third-
party beneficiaries of the contracts between health insurance organi-
zations and providers.  An Illinois court has yet to issue an opinion on
the validity of 215 ILCS 125/2-8(a) (2016) as it applies to the Health
Care Services Lien Act.218
213. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT.125/1-2(12) (2016).
214. See Overley, supra note 5.  Likewise, NorthShore University HealthSystem is a hospital
facility, and any physicians employed there through independent contractors, would all be con-
sidered “providers” as under HMO.
215. The hold-harmless clause is as follows:
The provider agrees that in no event,. . . shall the hospital provider or its assignees or
subcontractors have a right to seek any type of payment from, bill, charge, collect a
deposit from, or have any recourse against, the enrollee, persons acting on the en-
rollee’s behalf (other than the organization), the employer or group contract holder for
services provided pursuant to this contract except for the payment of applicable co-
payments or deductibles for services covered by the organization or fees for services
not covered by the organization. . . The organization’s enrollees, the persons acting on
the enrollee’s behalf (other than the organization) and the employer or group contract
holder shall be third party beneficiaries of this clause. This clause supersedes any oral
or written agreement now existing or hereafter entered into between the provider and
the enrollee, persons acting on the enrollee’s behalf (other than the organization) and
the employer or group contract holder. . .
215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 125/2-8(a) (2016).
216. Id.
217. Id. (emphasis added).
218. There is at least one class action complaint filed that includes a violation of the HMO as
a cause of action.  Complaint, Sirkorsky v. Edward Hosp., 2015 WL 738174 (Ill. Cir. Ct.) (No.
2015-L-000131).  The complaint was filed February 11, 2015.  The complaint alleged that the
defendant hospital violated the language of 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 125/2-8a by asserting a lien on
the proceeds of the plaintiffs’ lawsuit against the third-party tortfeasor.  A review of the online
case docket shows the case was dismissed with prejudice on December 17, 2015.
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However, an Illinois appellate court has addressed the validity of
the Hospital Lien Act with regard to the HMO Act.219  In Richmond
ex rel. Richmond v. Caban, the plaintiffs (a father and minor daugh-
ter) sustained $24,238.00 in medical expenses following an automobile
accident.220  The plaintiffs were covered by a Blue Cross/HMO Illinois
health insurance plan.221  Upon arriving at the hospital for treatment
the plaintiffs signed a “hospital agreement” prepared by the plaintiffs’
insurance policy administrator that set forth the procedures that the
hospital could seek reimbursement for covered medical expenses
when the policyholder was injured by a third party.222  The plaintiffs
later sued and eventually settled for $50,000.00; afterwards the hospi-
tals filed liens under the Hospital Lien Act for the services
rendered.223
While the court recognized that the hospital agreement did not re-
quire the hospital to bill the policy administrator,224 the court con-
cluded that section 2-8(a) of the HMO Act barred any claims for
recourse against the plaintiffs, except for the two exceptions listed in
the HMO Act itself.225  Thus, the hold-harmless clause of the HMO
Act invalidates a hospital lien unless the lien is filed pursuant to the
exceptions listed in the act.226  The court largely based its conclusions
on canons of statutory interpretation.227
Richmond occupies a peculiar place in Illinois case law.  It has never
been outright overruled; in fact, it has barely been cited since decided
in 2001.  While the case did concern the Hospital Lien Act, the prede-
cessor of the Health Care Services Lien Act, the implications of the
holding remain the same.228  The holding in Richmond should be read
to establish that the HMO Act invalidates hospital liens filed under
219. Richmond ex rel. Richmond v. Caban, 754 N.E.2d 871 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
220. Id. at 872.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 872–73.
223. Id. at 873.
224. Id. at 875.
225. Richmond, 754 N.E.2d at 876.  The two exceptions allow recourse for (1) applicable co-
payments or deductibles for the medical services covered by the plaintiff’s policy and (2) fees for
services not covered by the policy. Id. See also 215 ILL. COMP. STAT.125/2-8(a).
226. Richmond, 754 N.E.2d at 876.
227. Id. at 875.  The court mentioned when two statutes allegedly conflict, courts have a duty
to construe the statutes to avoid inconsistency and give effect to both statutes, if reasonably
possible. Id.  The court further rejected the contention that the hold-harmless clause would in-
validate all hospital liens, arguing instead that the relevant sections of the hospital lien act and
the HMO act could be construed to give effect to both without any inconsistencies. Id.
228. The Health Care Services Lien Act differs from its predecessors in only one significant
respect, that being the statutory caps and proportioning schemes, the basic analysis would ap-
pear to prevail.
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the Health Care Services Lien Act, absent the existence of the specific
exceptions outlined in the HMO Act.
While Richmond has not been followed in Illinois, other jurisdic-
tions agree with its reasoning.229  These jurisdictions have attacked not
only the agreements between insurers and providers, but also specific
hold-harmless language, just as the court in Richmond did.230  In
Parnell v. Adventist Health System/West the plaintiff was injured by a
third-party tortfeasor and received treatment at a hospital.231  The
hospital had a provider agreement with the plaintiff’s insurer to pro-
vide discounts on medical care.232  The hospital agreed to accept “as
payment in full” the amount set forth in the agreement.233  After ren-
dering treatment to the plaintiff the hospital, in accordance with the
provider agreement, was reimbursed by the plaintiff’s insurer.234
However, the hospital later asserted a lien under the state’s statutory
lien act seeking to recoup the difference between the amount of ser-
vices it billed versus the discounted amount it received under the pro-
vider agreement.235  The court held California’s lien statute required
the existence of an underlying debt in order for the lien to attach.236
Accordingly, since the plaintiff’s debt had been extinguished when the
hospital accepted payment from the insurer, the subsequent lien could
not attach.237
While the Richmond decision is one of the only cases to cite to and
analyze the HMO Act and health care liens, Illinois appellate courts
are split on the issues Parnell addressed.  The court in Parnell noted
that only one case squarely supported the defendant hospital’s inter-
229. See Dorr v. Sacred Heart Hosp., 597 N.W.2d 462 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999); Parnell v. Advent-
ist Health Sys./W., 109 P.3d 69 (Cal. 2005).
230. See Dorr, 597 N.W.2d at 472.  In Dorr, the defendant hospital did not bill plaintiff’s
insurance after a car accident, but instead filed a lien under the state’s lien act. Id. at 467–68.
The court of appeals of Wisconsin ruled that, because the provider agreement between the plain-
tiff’s insurance company and the hospital stated that the hospital would accept a certain reim-
bursement rate for services, the hospital waived any right to pursue the policyholder for services
covered by the provider agreement. Id. at 471–72.  The court also found that the provider agree-
ment operated as a payment in full provision, and in doing so, it followed that there was no
underlying debt to support the asserted lien. Id. at 472.  The hold-harmless agreement was de-
signed specifically for the purpose of protecting the insurance policy subscribers (here, the plain-
tiff). Id. at 475.  In spite of the express disclaimer of any third party beneficiaries to the contract,
the court ruled that the plaintiff was a third party beneficiary to the provider agreement. Id. at
475–76.
231. Parnell, 109 P.3d at 71.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 71–72.
234. Id. at 72.
235. Id.
236. Parnell, 109 P.3d at 73.
237. Id. at 79.
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pretation of their state lien act: Rogalla v. Christie Clinic, P.C.238  In
Rogalla, an Illinois appellate court considered whether the plaintiff
stated a cause of action as a third-party beneficiary of a medical ser-
vices agreement contract between the defendant health clinic and
plaintiff’s health insurance company.239  The plaintiff argued the de-
fendant could not attach a lien on the judgment because of the hold-
harmless clause in the medical services agreement.240  Plaintiff further
argued, citing to Richmond, that there is no debt for a lien to attach
because the debt was extinguished by the hold-harmless clause.241
The court held that the hold-harmless provision in the medical ser-
vices agreement did not limit the defendant’s ability to seek a lien
only to the amounts the defendant could obtain from the plaintiff
HMO member.242  The court then noted that the Physicians Lien Act
“is not an action against plaintiff and does not violate the hold-harm-
less provision of the Agreement.”243  In doing so, the court rejected
the reasoning in Richmond.244
Further confusing matters, in Lopez v. Morley, another Illinois ap-
pellate court expressly rejected Rogalla.245  The plaintiff was treated
by the defendant hospital after sustaining injuries in an automobile
accident.246  Plaintiff’s health insurance company had a contract with
the defendant that said the defendant would accept less than the rea-
sonable value of service rendered to plaintiff for payment.247  Further,
the amount paid by plaintiff’s health insurance to defendant would be
considered payment in full.248  After the plaintiff settled her lawsuit
with the tortfeasor for $120,000.00, the defendant hospital maintained
it held a valid lien for the difference between what was charged to the
plaintiff and what was provided as payment in full from plaintiff’s
health insurance company.249  The court was not persuaded.250  In ref-
238. Id.
239. Rogalla v. Christie Clinic, P.C., 794 N.E.2d 384, 387 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).  The medical
services agreement was a “capitation” contract. Id.  According to the agreement, the defendant
would seek no payment from the plaintiff organizations HMO members other than copayments
and deductibles. Id.  The court went on to note that the distinction between a medical services
agreement and an HMO agreement is “not important.” Id. at 392.
240. Id. at 389.
241. Id.
242. Rogalla, 794 N.E.2d at 389.
243. Id. at 392.
244. Id. at 391.
245. Lopez v. Morley, 817 N.E.2d 592, 599 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
246. Id. at 594.  The plaintiff was charged $33,753.27 for her treatment. Id.
247. Id. at 598.
248. Id.  As a result, the defendant received $4,900.00 as payment in full for plaintiff’s
treatment.
249. Id.
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erence to Rogalla, the court noted that its decision in N.C. ex rel. L.C.
v. A.W. ex rel. R.W. was read too broadly; instead, the court held it
stood for the more narrow proposition that contracts will be given
their effects.251  Therefore, because the defendant-appellant did not
produce the contract between the health insurance company and the
defendant hospital, the court held that the trial court properly ruled
the payment-in-full clause extinguished all debts.252
Lopez v. Morley rejects all arguments in favor of hospitals asserting
liens after accepting payments in full for their services.  The Lopez
court noted that its decision does not allow injured parties to recover
more than was actually paid to hospitals,253 a “windfall,” but is rather
simply an application of the collateral source rule.254
The decision still allows the lessening of financial burdens on hospi-
tals because hospitals can enter into contracts to retain their right to
recover through hospital liens.255  However, this policy does not re-
lieve hospitals of contractual obligations they later regret.256  While
Lopez did not deal directly with the Health Care Services Lien Act, its
analysis and reasoning should apply.  The holding in Lopez prohibits
hospitals from asserting liens under the Act after entering into HMO
provider agreements that contain a hold-harmless clause.257  One way
hospitals could comply with the HMO Act and retain their rights to
assert liens under the Act would be to explicitly provide for that right
in the contract.  This is entirely consistent with the Lopez assertion
that the court was simply giving effect to the written contracts be-
tween the parties.
Even though Lopez applied to the Physician’s Lien Act, this should
not temper its applicability. Lopez, by exhibiting a willingness to in-
validate liens, should give plaintiffs hope that Illinois courts may soon
250. The court analyzed its prior decisions in Richmond ex rel. Richmond v. Caban as well as
N.C. ex rel. L.C. v. A.W. ex rel. R.W.  Lopez, 817 N.E.2d at 595–99.
251. Id.  In N.C., the court held that the health providers contact with the insurance company
extinguished all debts once the payment in full was received.  Therefore, no lien could attach on
the plaintiff’s action because there was no debt left for the lien to satisfy. Id. at 595.
252. Id. at 599.  Interestingly, the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association filed an amicus curiae
brief on behalf of the plaintiff. Id. at 594.  This reinforces the long-standing tradition of the
battle between plaintiff’s lawyers and defendant hospitals with health care liens and their
application.
253. This contention arises from the fact that, during settlement negotiations, the plaintiff
represented to the defendant tortfeasor that the medical bills were for the total billed amount of
$33,753.27, and not the $4,900.00 that was accepted as payment in full by the defendant hospital.
Id. at 594.
254. Lopez, 817 N.E.2d. at 599.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 125/2-8 (2016).
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reconsider their interpretation of the Act.  If citizens are required to
purchase health insurance, and if that plan is an HMO, then that in-
surance provider must comply with the Illinois HMO Act when enter-
ing into provider contracts with hospitals.258  If the hospital does not
retain its right to assert a lien under the Health Care Services Lien
Act, then the contract must be carried out, and the hospital will not
have the ability to assert any liens.  However, the current law in Illi-
nois regarding the Health Care Services Lien Act and the HMO Act
does not effectuate parties’ intent under their contracts, but rather im-
poses a monumental barrier to plaintiffs bringing personal injury suits.
IV. IMPACT
Part V begins by noting the factors independent of the Act that
operate as barriers to plaintiffs bringing suit.  Part V then discusses
the provision in the Act that enables medical providers and profes-
sionals to initiate suit even after fulfillment of a lien.  Part V concludes
that plaintiffs face overwhelming obstacles and in this context rarely
find justice.
A. The Barriers to Bringing Lawsuits
Any discussion regarding barriers must begin with the unique way
parties pay to bring and execute lawsuits in the United States.  In the
United States, unless otherwise provided for by statute or contract,
each party to a lawsuit pays their own fees.259  Plaintiffs contemplating
whether or not to bring suit must weigh their personal risk against the
potential reward.260  Aside from attorneys fees that are deducted from
the judgment or settlement, plaintiffs incur significant costs during the
258. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 125/2-8 (2016).
259. John Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation:  The Injured Person’s Access
to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1569 (1993).  Conversely, the English Rule allows for fee-
shifting, such that the “loser” of the lawsuit pays for the opposing party’s fees. Id. For a com-
prehensive analysis of the American Rule and its origins, see John Leubsdorf, Toward a History
of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 9
(1984).
260. Id. at 1594.
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litigation process.261  For example, the median automobile personal
injury case costs $43,000.00.262
Personal injury plaintiffs also face yet another barrier in the Act’s
provision that allows for lawsuits to be brought against the plaintiff for
amounts not recovered after satisfaction of the medical lien.263  This
section of the Act can operate as a final blow to plaintiffs after they
receive their judgment or settlement.  Plaintiffs may believe, after all
liens have been satisfied and they receive their final settlement or
judgment check, that the matter is closed.  However, this section of
the Act provides that the matter may not be resolved until years after
the trial ends.264  Given the often inflated “reasonable charges” that
hospitals use, any lien that cannot be negotiated to a final amount
with the medical provider is subject to further action under the Act.265
B. Proposed Solutions
The Illinois Legislature does not need to go through the exhaustive
amendment process to reduce burdens on personal injury plaintiffs.266
One key solution already exists in the HMO Act.267  Adherence to the
HMO Act in instances where appropriate gives all parties—personal
injury plaintiffs, insurance companies, and hospitals—the benefits of
their bargain.268  Applying the HMO Act removes a substantial bar-
rier from plaintiffs bringing suit and works towards making them
whole again.269
261. Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation, 20
COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, no. 1, Jan. 2013, available at http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/
Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSPH_online2.ashx.  Litigation tasks can be generally cat-
egorized as follows: Case Initiation, Discovery, Settlement, Pretrial Motions, Trial, and Post-
Disposition. Id. at 2.
262. Id. at 7.  To compare, automobile personal injury costs are at the lower end of the spec-
trum.  Premises liability, real property, employment, contract, and malpractice cases are all cost-
lier. Id.
263. 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 23/45 (2003).  The section provides, in full:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as limiting the right of a health care professional
or health care provider, or attorney, to pursue collection, through all available means,
of its reasonable charges for the services it furnishes to an injured person. Notwith-
standing any other provision of law, a lien holder may seek payment of the amount of
its reasonable charges that remain not paid after the satisfaction of its lien under this
Act.
264. Id.
265. 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 23/45 (2003).
266. State Universities Retirement Systems of Illinois, How a Bill Becomes a Law in Illinois
(May 14, 2012), available at http://www.surs.org/pdfs/legal/How_a_Bill_Becomes_a_Law.pdf.
267. See 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 125 (2016).
268. See supra notes 220–28 and accompanying text.
269. Molot, supra note 12, at 63.
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Additionally, all of the above analyzed doctrines, which have almost
all been resolved in favor of hospitals and health care providers,
should be revisited with personal injury plaintiffs in mind.  While any
one doctrine favoring hospitals over personal injury plaintiffs may
seem small, in the aggregate plaintiffs suffer greatly.  Review of these
doctrines is necessary to promote fair outcomes in personal injury
lawsuits.270
What is not advocated for is a scheme in which hospitals and health
care providers are not adequately compensated for their services.  In-
stead, given the institutional advantages these entities enjoy, namely
the chargemaster system and overall wealth profile, a more just and
fair system exists where personal injury plaintiffs receive more com-
pensation.  The current landscape enables these entities to charge in-
flated rates and recover on those rates despite valid legal and policy
grounds militating otherwise.
V. CONCLUSION
The Illinois Health Care Services Lien Act provides a guaranteed
avenue of recovery for health care providers and professionals.271
This is not an undesirable outcome necessarily, as health care provid-
ers would be reluctant to provide care for injured persons that are
unlikely to pay.272  However, the Act has been interpreted by courts at
the expense of personal injury plaintiffs such that the end result is a
decreased recovery for those who suffered physical injuries.  Despite
the purported justification for the Act plaintiffs are in fact disincen-
tivized from bringing suit.  Personal injury plaintiffs in Illinois, like the
Premovics, find support in other states challenging the practices of
medical providers in personal injury cases.273
270. Although, again, the outlook for change is not optimistic.  The process to pass legislation
is lengthy and tiresome.  The process to overrule judicial decisions requires the perfect storm of
factors: a case must arise with the precise issue at stake, the court must hear the case, and the
deciding justices must articulate some reason to ignore the command of stare decisis.  Of course,
the judicial process is moot if legislation is passed addressing and overruling the judicial
decisions.
271. 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 23 (2003).
272. Alex Schulte, Healthcare Liens and the Common Fund Doctrine: The Need for Legislative
Action to Prevent Fee Shifting at the Expense of Healthcare Providers, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1763,
1768 (2012) (“The prevailing policy objective behind state healthcare lien statutes is to enable
healthcare providers to secure some compensation for their treatment of uninsured or underin-
sured individuals.”).
273. See Marci Manley, Fox16 Investigates: Arkansas Teacher Sues Hospital Over Billing Prac-
tices, FOX NEWS, http://www.fox16.com/news/local-news/fox16-investigates-arkansas-teacher-
sues-hospital-over-billing-practices/299573621; Thomas Bailey Jr., Mean liens? Regional One
Health, attorneys disagree on lawsuit’s impact, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Jan. 16, 2015), http://
archive.commercialappeal.com/news/mean-liens-regional-one-health-attorneys-disagree-on-law
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The Illinois Legislature should respond to these outcomes by
amending the Act to provide further relief for those most in need—
personal injury plaintiffs.274  In fact, the legislature need not even
amend the Act for this process to begin, as the HMO Act may provide
the avenue for increased compensation for personal injury plain-
tiffs.275  At a time where having insurance is mandated,276 personal
injury plaintiffs deserve a bigger slice of the pie.
Zachary Reynolds
suits-impact-ep-880979877-324487421.html; Steve Everly, St. Luke’s Hospital Settles Health In-
surance Cases with Accident Victims, KANSAS CITY STAR (Apr. 25, 2014), http://www.kansas
city.com/news/business/article346893/St.-Luke%E2%80%99s-Hospital-settles-health-insurance-
cases-with-accident-victims.html.
274. Such legislation could involve interpretations and applications of the Common Fund
Doctrine, subrogation (to a clearer extent than the 2013 amendment to the Act), Medicare,
Medicaid, and the HMO Act.  Involving each of these doctrines would require health care prov-
iders and professionals to bill plaintiff’s health insurance, with the resulting lien amounts for the
discounted rates.  However, the legislature decides to apply the common fund doctrine would
clarify any fee-shifting requirements.  The only remaining liens to be settled and negotiated
would be any subrogation liens.
275. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 125/2-8(a) (2016).  In situations where the HMO Act applies, medi-
cal providers, insurance companies, and personal injury plaintiffs would all get their respective
benefits bargained for.
276. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
